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Rule and Rupture. State Formation Through the 
Production of Property and Citizenship
Introduction
Weak, fragile and failed. Mainstream scholarship on states 
and state formation in post-colonial societies has often 
used these adjectives to describe dysfunctional public
administrations. Kaplan’s seminal article (1994), ‘The
Coming Anarchy’, which sketched out imminent
lawlessness and state disintegration, was the forerunner of 
huge scholarly interest in state formation in poor
countries. This first generation of the ‘fragile states’
literature, with its focus on how actual government
structures fall short of an ideal Weberian index of a
rational state, was, however, essentialist, ahistorical and
teleological (for a concise overview see Hoffmann and 
Kirk, 2013). The present brief contributes to a novel
understanding of public authority and state formation.
It draws on a recent publication, Rule and Rupture,
edited by Christian Lund and Michael Eilenberg (2016), 
and argues that public authority is not simply given but
constituted through social contracts of property and
citizenship. And this is an ongoing process.
The argument
Treating the ‘state’ as a finished product gets in the way of 
understanding it. The state is always in the making. Political 
authority is (re-)produced through its successful exercise; 
especially when excercised over important issues in relation 
to the social actors concerned. We suggest to investigate 
and specify contracts of recognition as the key dynamic 
of the constitution of public authority, and by extension, 
‘stateness’. 
Property and citizenship represent two fundamental aspects 
of social life: what we have and who we are - avoir and être 
- and they are intimately related in their constitution. The 
core element of both rights is recognition. Moreover, when 
institutions recognize claims to property or citizenship, they 
themselves become recognized by the claimants of these 
rights. That is to say, rights and authority are mutually and 
simultaneously established. Claims to property and
citizenship rights therefore invoke public authority and
governing capacity in different institutions, be they
statutory or not. And, conversely, those who can claim 
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to authorize people’s claims to property and citizenship 
acquire and exercise state quality. 
Put differently, struggles over property and citizenship are 
about the scope and constitution of political authority. 
Hence, investigating the social production of property and 
citizenship enables concrete understanding of the dynamics 
of authority, or state formation. The argument is that the 
ability to entitle and disenfranchise people with regard to 
property, to establish the conditions under which they hold 
that property - together with the ability to define who
belongs and who does not, and to establish and uphold 
rank, privilege and social servitude in its many forms - is 
constitutive of state power. 
Rights and political authority come about simultaneously in 
the dynamic of mutual recognition. Hence, the control
exercised by institutions over resources and political
subjectivities does not represent a pre-existing authority. 
It produces it. Conversely, effective rights do not represent 
pre-existing natural rights. They are political constructions 
and achievements and part of social contracts. To grasp 
these dialectics of rights and authority, we therefore need 
to dispense with simple assumptions that political
authority exists prior to rights of property and citizenship. 
Rights originate in claims. Sometimes they are hard-fought 
and not all claims result in rights. Rights are not simply 
there, bestowed on people by some benevolent higher 
body; they are wrested from power. 
Mutual recognition constitutes a contract, that links
property and citizenship to political authority in society. In
exchange for recognized valuable property rights in land 
and other entitlements, people recognize the political 
power of the institution by payment of tax in the form of 
money, tribute, labour, allegiance, or other resources. We 
use the word ‘contract’ loosely, because such contracts are 
not exactly voluntary, not always consensual, often
contentious, and always under renegotiation. Thus, they do 
not necessarily imply continuous or stable recognition of 
the legitimacy of the contractual terms. As rights and public 
authority are co-produced, the erosion of one also means 
the dissipation of the other. Political ruptures may break the 
contract, and rights held under one regime may evaporate 
under the next.
Social contracts of governance and rights are not reserved 
for statutory institutions alone. The ability to govern can 
effectively reside in institutions other than formal 
government. Claims to rights prompt the exercise of
authority, and, as claimants lodge claims with a broad 
range of institutions, authority and governance can
consequently emerge in a broad field of institutions.
Statutory institutions (legislative, judiciary and executive) 
may effectively govern, but it is more appropriate to treat 
this as an empirical question than a pre-established fact 
and more productive to identify actual authorities in social 
fields of property and citizenship. Thus, no single institution 
defines and enforces rights and exercises public authority as 
such.
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Property is more than ‘private property’. Property is 
often - quite perfunctorily - equated with absolute, 
unfettered ownership. However, ownership is always 
circumscribed by others’ rights, which limit the exercise 
of an abstract total right to property. We therefore 
understand property as a legitimized claim to 
something of value sanctioned by some form of 
political authority. Struggles over property - very often 
in the form of land - can therefore be seen as 
struggles for the recognition of a wide variety of rights 
to access resources in various ways. These range from 
rights to reside and settle, through rights to use and 
extract, and extend to the right to transact those very 
rights.
Citizenship can be defined as meaningful membership 
of an organized political body. Citizenship goes beyond 
having a passport, just like having a passport does 
not necessarily ensure having meaningful citizenship 
rights. Struggles for citizenship are, generally, struggles 
for the recognition of the very right to have rights in 
society. Formal national citizenship is therefore just one 
of several forms of belonging. For most people, several 
political bodies are relevant for different aspects of life. 
Citizenship therefore makes up their political ‘visibility’ 
and denotes the political institution through which a 
person derives rights of membership to a community. 
In many places, land is a resource to which access is 
ensured not merely through the market or by
membership of a national community: local citizenship, 
belonging, and status are often just as important.
BOX 1
School principal showing the the commemorative plate of official inauguration 
of the school by the mayor; a school initially built by a farmers’ movement on 
squatted land in illegality. West Java. Photo: Christian Lund
 
 
•	 First, in drafting development interventions it is important to take into consideration that state institutions may not be the only 
players within a field and, hence, neither the only potential source of problems nor partner in solving them. Consequently, if 
development interventions in a given field are under consideration, it is important to investigate what institutions are actually 
involved in the field already and to be open to the eventuality that they may not be statutory government institutions. In fields as 
diverse as security and education, infrastructure and land allocation, policies will have to take into account actors and institutions 
that already govern. Otherwise, failure of implementation is often inevitable. 
•	 Second, to formulate realistic policies it is important to investigate the existing multiple relations of accountability and the 
processes of legitimation of claims to rights and authority. Most institutions are accountable up, down, and sideways in all but 
simple ways. Mapping out political, social, and legal dynamics and techniques, which establish relations of authority amongst 
different groups of actors through the production of property and of rights, will produce a realistic idea of the field. Again, 
legitimation and accountability may take forms that diverge significantly from ‘good governance’ templates.  
•	 Finally, any intervention in the governance of a significant social field is as political as it is technical. Property, citizenship, security, 
infrastructure, land tenure, education etc., are not discrete governance challenges to fix and order, but existing relations of 
mutual recognition, competition, power and rights. They may be characterised by inefficiency, waste, and unfairness, and they 
may well deserve political intervention and improvement. However, development intervention is not simply a top-down 
mechanism co-authored with ‘the state’, but rather yet another political action of defining and recognizing rights and institutions 
in a field in which a broad set of actors already compete. Intervention therefore re-orders and challenges existing, sometimes 
entrenched, positions of entitlement and privilege. Consequently, interventions should be understood as political engagements 
in state formation. Agencies that intervene must therefore assess the political terrain that they may be inclined to change, 
because political intervention may impede parity of participation and exclude certain groups, and enable and empower different 
institutions to exercise authority. This raises a set of fundamental ethical questions: Who defines the ‘problem’ and to whom is 
the ‘intervenor’ accountable? The concerned population, the national government, or the government of the home country of 
the donor?
Policy Implications 
These research results have fundamental policy implications: 
Property and its regulation are often conjured up from
below by popular state practices. Research from countries 
as varied as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Congo, Indonesia, Nepal, and Somalia, presented in Lund 
and Eilenberg (2016), shows how people act in the
anticipation of government regulation long before any is 
formally adopted. Governance is conducted by
government and many other private or non-statutory
institutions, from neighbourhood associations to militias, 
from farmers’ associations to chiefs and NGOs. Residents of
informal urban settlements, f.ex., often organize their 
settlements in conformity with the formal technical norms 
(such as street width or the numbering of houses) in
anticipation of recognition. By forming ‘societies’ or
‘associations’ with présidents de secteurs people may resist 
and avert eviction and ensure access to public utilities; 
established presence may enable people to acquire identity 
cards (or proxies such as voting cards, or cards of
membership of political or cultural associations); paying for 
utilities provides customers with receipts documenting and
legitimizing residence; and people’s possession of land 
allows for the gradual build-up of expectations of
recognition. Likewise, by forming health committees,
market guilds, or parent–teacher associations before there is 
a clinic, a marketplace or a school, citizens enter the orbit of 
certain governing institutions and conjure up the exercise of 
authority and recognition by anticipating the social contract 
with a public authority. In order to establish a contract of 
mutual recognition, the inhabitants often act and organize 
as they presuppose the municipality would expect proper 
citizens to act. But when statutory institutions are weak or 
absent, other institutions may perform the role of ‘state’. 
Chiefs, churches, cooperatives, development projects, 
farmers’ unions, hometown and youth associations, political 
parties, strong-men, militias, vigilantes, and fragments of 
ministries may effectively be invested with state quality, 
when they respond to claims.
The contributions to Rule and Rupture investigate how 
new forms of property and citizenship are produced; how 
old ones are challenged and sometimes reproduced; and, 
most significantly, how political authorities have emerged 
through ruptures by their ability to respond to claims and 
create, bestow, and protect rights of property and
citizenship. The contributions are all the result of extensive 
fieldwork following different ruptures, i.e. particular
moments that unsettle the course of history and social and 
political organization. Hence, simple labels — ‘weak’, 
‘fragile’, ‘failed’ — are shown to be facile and inadequate.
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Irregular settlement under the protection of a youth/gangster organisation, IPK, 
in Medan, North Sumatra. Photo: Christian Lund
Conclusion: State formation through the production of property and citizenship
Claims to rights invoke political authority and the governing capacity of institutions. The categorization of property and 
citizens is a way for institutions to claim authority and acquire and exercise state power. Different combinations of property 
and citizenship are constantly produced and reproduced in this dynamic, and new institutional alliances with the capacity 
to define and enforce rules of property and citizenship frequently emerge. Understanding these dynamics of state
formation requires grounded, empirical research allowing us to go beyond state theories modelled after ahistorical ideal 
types.
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The Sundanese Peasant Union (SPP) Training Centre, Garut. SPP has organised land occupations, 
re-distribution of occupied land, and provision of non-statutory public infrastructure in West Java. 
Photo: Christian Lund
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